telegram.org
Failing
Whether known and novel abuse material is found at all, and across which surfaces of the product.
Hash matching on publicly posted media
Public channels and groups reach hundreds of thousands of members. No hash-matching programme covering them has been described. [1]
Hash matching on private messages and attachments
No detection described on private messaging.
Classifier detection of previously unseen material
No classifier-based detection described.
Detection applied to live and streamed video
No detection described on live surfaces.
Detection of grooming and solicitation in text
No solicitation detection described.
Participation in industry hash-sharing programmes
Not a participant in industry hash-sharing programmes as of the review date. [1]
What the operator tells NCMEC, law enforcement and the public, and whether those disclosures can be checked.
Files CyberTipline reports to NCMEC
Absent from NCMEC's list of reporting electronic service providers for the years reviewed. [2]
Publishes child-safety enforcement figures
No transparency report covering child-safety enforcement.
Report quality sufficient for investigation
No reports, so no report quality.
Reporting cadence and timeliness
Not applicable in the absence of reporting.
What happens after material is found: how fast it comes down, what happens to the account, and whether the decision can be contested.
Time to removal of confirmed material
No removal-latency figure. Removal is documented as inconsistent even following direct notification. [3]
Account termination on confirmed violation
Policy prohibits the conduct on public surfaces. Enforcement against private distribution is not evidenced.
Prevention of re-registration
Registration requires a phone number only. No described re-registration control.
Preservation of evidence
No preservation commitment published.
Escalation of imminent-harm cases
No documented imminent-harm escalation path.
The design decisions that determine how much abuse is possible in the first place, before any detection is applied.
Protective defaults for minor accounts
No distinct minor account type.
Restrictions on adult-initiated contact with minors
No restriction on adult-initiated contact. Proximity-based discovery has been repeatedly identified as a vector. [3]
Age assurance at registration
No age assurance.
Recommendation systems assessed for minor-safety harm
Channel and bot discovery surfaces have not been assessed publicly.
Encryption posture and stated mitigations
Default chats are not end-to-end encrypted, so server-side detection is available and is not applied. The encryption posture does not explain the absence of detection.
Published child-safety policy with defined enforcement
Terms prohibit the conduct on public surfaces. No stated enforcement mechanism.
Documented failures, enforcement actions, litigation and investigative reporting bearing on the assessment above.
2024-08-24
Pavel Durov was detained at Le Bourget and subsequently placed under formal investigation, with the distribution of CSAM among the counts cited by French prosecutors, alongside complicity in other offences and refusal to cooperate with lawful requests. [4]
2024-09
Following the arrest the operator announced changes to its handling of unlawful content and its response to legal requests. No child-safety enforcement figures have been published since. [5]
Telegram · 2025
Illustrative placeholder · 2024
Parquet de Paris · 2024-08-26
Telegram · 2024-09
If we’ve missed a controversy or there’s newer reporting on Telegram, tell us. If you represent Telegram, we welcome documentation of safety measures not yet reflected here.
Contact usIf you have encountered CSAM, file a report through one of these channels.